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Using Chiara Lubich’s conceptualization of individuals as one “human 
family,” Cosseddu explores a fundamental tension in legal theory be-
tween on the one hand the freedom of persons for whom law is written, 
and the norms necessary for regulating life in common on the other. The 
interpretive key Cosseddu offers for bridging this tension is “relation-
ality,” by which the other is construed not as an object to be acted upon 
but as a fully personal subject who coexists with me and for me. Thus, 
the law serves justice by identifying situations of comfort and pain and 
offering the possibility of rebuilding a logic of free gift in relations. The 
author positions the concept of restorative justice as a “privileged space 
for ‘dialogue’ and reciprocity,” and suggests that from the perspective of 
mutual love, the purpose of law is not to maintain boundaries but to 
bridge the voids in human experience.
The State of Law Today:  Life for Norms or Norms for Life? Contemporary practitioners and scholars of law are pre-
sented with a task that offers both possibility and challenge: to 
discern the “signs” present in the life of a person, which serve as a 
witness to the times in which we live. On this basis, they can then 
reinterpret “life,” what Hannah Arendt called “the world, under-
stood as the space of human relations . . . the space where people 
meet and clash.”1 It is such a world that frames the life of Chiara 
Lubich, who has made of it a space where real men and women 
dwell, a locus for genuine encounter and dialogue despite whatever 
differences divide them. In her, peoples and cultures have found 
a significance not defined by fragmentation. In their variety, they 
appear as tiles in the mosaic that humanity can form in its call to 
become one human family.
An echo of this can be found in the Preamble to the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, as well as in the preamble 
of the statute instituting the International Criminal Court (which 
came into force on July 1, 2002), which notes “that all peoples 
are united by common bonds, their cultures pieced together in 
a shared heritage .  .  . delicate mosaic.”2 This vision of humanity 
1. See Alessandra Papa, Nati per incominciare: Vita e politica in Hanna Arendt (Milan: 
Vita e Pensiero, 2011), 164. Author’s translation. Unless otherwise noted, quotations 
from sources written in languages other than English have been translated by the 
author.
2. Approaching the basis of a “new humanism,” Irina Bokova, Director General of 
UNESCO, has recently affirmed: “The human being is not fully itself if not in union 
with the other, in community. . . . But all cultures of the world are gathered together 
in the unity of human civilization. . . . It is our responsibility . . . to build a common 
space and not to exclude anyone. . . . We must infuse a new energy for solidarity and 
reintegrate it into the universal community.” “l’UNESCO et les fondements du nouvel 
humanisme,” Discours à l’occasion de la cérémonie de présentation de diplôme honoris causa 
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as a family in unity3 was something Chiara thought about and 
experienced. It has both a personal and a social dimension, and 
it provides a perspective from which it is possible to look at the 
being of each human person for whom law has been established. In 
truth, the most important aspect of Chiara’s thought is not about 
the law. And yet, in her own life first of all, she did not hesitate to 
embrace the contrasts and divisions in the social fabric, its wounds 
and lacerations; that is, everything that the law assumes as its par-
ticular subject matter and seeks to resolve.
Let us, then, as practitioners and scholars of law, go back to 
the original ideas that legal philosophers see in the “sources,” even 
though we will have to limit ourselves to only a few essential re-
marks. We can begin to define these “sources” by going to “that 
deeply rooted underground reservoir from which the spring draws 
its content and its vitality.” This means that when we speak of the 
sources of law we should refer not “to the superficial strata of so-
ciety, but rather to those most hidden and fundamental, meaning 
we speak of the foundations of an entire legal order.”4
en politique européenne et internationale (Milan, October 7, 2010). In Paris, on Decem-
ber 17, 1996, Chiara Lubich received the UNESCO prize for Peace Education.
3. From the start Chiara located its “center” in the Fatherhood of God who is present 
in human history. She wrote in October 1949: “He [Jesus] too gazed upon the crowds 
around him whom he loved as himself. . . . He wanted to forge the bonds that would 
unite them to him, like children to a father, and unite them to one another as brothers 
and sisters. He came down from heaven to reunite us as family: to make us all one.” 
(Chiara Lubich, “The Resurrection of Rome,” Essential Writings [New City and New 
City Press: London and New York, 2007], 173). This was her reflection as she looked 
at Rome, the origin of a history to which its monuments continue to witness and, at 
the same time, the origin of a legal tradition still present in many countries. Those 
“crowds,” meaning a collective made up of individuals and peoples, are seen by Chiara 
in their specifically relational dimension as children of the same Father.
4. Paolo Grossi, “Pagina introduttiva (ancora sulle fonti del diritto),” in Quaderni 
Fiorentini per la storia del pensiero giuridico moderno 29 (2000): 1–7. “Sources,” as a 
Thus, it is not only the norm that gives life to the foundation 
of law. Nor does law consist solely in its norms. The legal dimen-
sion sums up the life of an entire society in its interwoven fabric 
of relationships and persons who, by their actions, give life to the 
world of relations. We are speaking here of the experience of law. 
The Italian Constitution acknowledges this to be “the coming into 
evidence . . . as the source of law . . . of the person and of what is 
formed socially by persons.”5 Georges Gurvitch affirms that “the 
forms of society serve . . . as the primary sources of law.”6 These 
are not merely dull questions of the past and the present.7 If legal 
culture arrives at the point of questioning itself about “reducing” 
the legal system to mere laws, a product of the legal technique, it 
also starts the troublesome process that leads to “legal nihilism.”8 
metaphor signifies, “the point where the coming light [of a water stream] becomes 
visible.” It is “the place . . . where it passes from invisibility to visibility,” from below 
ground to the surface, according to Enrico Paresce, “Fonti del diritto (a) Filosofia del 
diritto” in Enciclopedia del diritto XVII (Milan: Giuffrè Editore, 1968), 893–921. Here 
too can be found reference to the theory of the sources of law in its complexity and 
evolution. 
5. Gianfranco Garancini, “Figure di costituenti: Egidio Tosato e Costantino Mor-
tati,” Quaderni dI Iustitia (2010): 96.
6. See the recent reconstruction of Gurvitch’s thought, going back to L’idée du droit 
social (Paris: Sirey, 1932), and Alberto Scerbo, “Diritti sociali e pluralismo giuridico in 
Gurvitch,” in Tigor: Rivista di scienze della comunicazione 1 (2011): 45–46.
7. On the one hand, the way law is constructed, going back to Kelsen’s pure theory, 
offers the normative guarantee through the method by which norms are made. On the 
other, in the variety of values in Weber’s view, there can be seen “the loss, in legal the-
ory and practice, of any kind of basis or effective anchoring for law.” Gustavo Zagre-
belsky, La legge e la sua giustizia (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2008), 90. By way of comparison 
with the Anglo- Saxon world, the question of sources in the analysis of the concept of 
“law” can be examined in H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1994). The topic is considered more recently in Ronald Dworkin, Justice in 
Robes (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).
8. This is fundamental in general theory for Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre (Vienna: 
F. Deuticke, 1960), and taken up today by Natalino Irti, Diritto senza verità 
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In the face of what seems to be a blind alley for every kind of legal 
discourse, today we are directing our reflection back to the experi-
ence of law. We will bring together the world of human behavior 
and relationships and the world of norms in one, vast world.9 This 
world operates in a tension, we could say, between the one and the 
many.
Let us follow Chiara from this point to the “sources” of law 
in the person. The person is the “source” of all relations, including 
those of a legal nature, because the person is constituted by being 
in relation. And relationship can be conceived as an original form 
of otherness, as Chiara herself states: “In the midst of the war, the 
most painful of divisions, paradoxically we chose the highest form 
of interdependence: unity.”10 Although the “way” by which this 
is expressed in practice is love for other human beings, leading to 
dialogue, for Chiara the “source” is found in the communion of 
a God who shares life with humankind. This communion offers 
the possibility of a new “style” of action in every sense of the term. 
Love becomes law, as Chiara puts it, and it can also fill with itself 
(Rome- Bari: Laterza, 2011), in particular, pages ix- xiii and 57–64. A stage in which 
legal nihilism becomes a “journey” toward a new solitude that extends its shadow over 
law affected by a “loss of ancient foundations” is approached in the thought of Irti in 
his “law without truth,” the “future prospects of possible laws,” in other words, “all the 
possible contents of the human will” in each person. The basis of law, Irti notes, comes 
back to the individual self, the personal ego, where the Kelsenian view of fundamental 
norm is translated into the choice by each person of his or her individual Grundnorm. 
There is no lack in what Kelsen proposes of the horizontal dimension, which “concerns 
the relationship between us and the others” (115).
9. See Riccardo Orestano, Diritta: Incontri e scontri (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1981) 505–
506, 552, and 554n92. A fundamental view is that of Giuseppe Capograssi, 
“L’esperienza giuridica nella storia” and “Appunti sull’esperienza giuridica,” Opere, 
Vol. 3 (Milan: Giuffre, 1959), 269–96 and 402–43. 
10. Chiara Lubich, Essential Writings, 266.
the living out of norms in actual experience. Indeed, law, which 
is called to provide norms for living for the relations between 
people, can become the place where, in Chiara’s understanding, 
love is translated into a culture of giving. This was the experience 
of  the first community in Trent, where amid the falling bombs 
and the carnage of war, when no other law was present, love be-
came the norm of life, able to offer solutions to innumerable social 
problems in a renewed form of neighborliness.
Law therefore is not lost. But central place is given, as it were, 
to the typical material of human relationships for which law pro-
vides discipline. At the same time, the individual contribution of 
each person is not lost, but the norm that is provided and that 
forms the basis for personal choices does not isolate the self in a 
unique space that must be defended. Rather, it opens the self to 
every other. In this way, while the norm provides the rules, the 
subjects, who are part of the relationship, are entrusted with the 
“way of being” of the very relation to which they give life.
“Relationality”: A Hermeneutic Key for Law 
What has been said so far could be taken to suggest (and perhaps 
it does, insofar as the philosophy of law is concerned) a tension 
between the terms agape and law, which are generally considered 
irreconcilable. The terms seem opposite to one another: the first 
is situated in freedom and the second, traditionally, in obliga-
tion. As such they can only be coordinated, not united. Instead, 
re- examining the category of “civil responsibility,” the Canadian 
scholar Nicholas Kasirer asks, “Who is my neighbor?” It is the 
question posed by those who practice both civil law and com-
mon law as they seek common ground in their research into agape 
and fundamental legal categories. His study begins with a new 
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question: is there “Un devoir juridique de donner?”11 These ques-
tions can never find answers; nor does Chiara offer for these terms 
a reductio ad unum. Rather, she suggests a perspective that of itself 
can inform both relational life and the sphere of legal experience. 
Consider the contemporary issue of globalization. While it 
relativizes the geography of nation- states, it also generates ways 
of protecting the identities of groups and traditions. Law too, so 
necessary for the life of nations, is no longer confined to national 
boundaries. And yet, without confusion, the law makes it possible 
to value one’s own “universal” component: in its rules, and by gen-
eralizing from its principles, it can indeed address anyone. Tanella 
Boni, commenting on human rights in Article 4 of the UNESCO 
Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity (Paris, November 2, 
2001), observes: “Beyond the multiplicity of points of view, it is 
humanity that is under discussion . . . a humanity that is not ab-
stract but incarnated in the ‘human person’ taken individually.”12
The relational dimension that emerges in Chiara’s thought 
helps us understand that the anyone, who is the subject of norms, 
does not remain a stranger or somebody against whom I must 
defend myself. Instead it is the someone I meet in every relation, 
including legal relations (seller or buyer, victim or defendant). It 
offers the possibility, we might say, of overcoming the widespread 
and seemingly insuperable gap between theory and practice, norm 
and life, thereby transforming the crucial legal distinction between 
11. Nicholas Kasirer, Director of the Quebec Research Centre of Private and Com-
parative Law, “Agapè,” Revue internationale de droit comparé 53 (2001): 575–600.
12. Tanella Boni, originally from the Ivory Coast, was professor of philosophy at 
Cocody, Abidjan. See her “Les droits de l’homme: Garants de la diversité culturelle,” 
in Résonances: La diversité culturelle: Une voie vers le développement (Paris: Unesco, 
2011), 23. About the Declaration cited here, see also Ban Ki- Moon, Kofi Annan, 
Claude Lèvi Strauss, Amartya Sen. 
having and being. “To have or to be” becomes to give in order to 
be. And giving also inspires a “culture of the rule of law,” the first 
measure of our attention to the other.
It is clear that in Chiara we are introduced to “another” vi-
sion of law. Law is no longer considered only as a bond, however 
necessary, between precept and sanction, coercion and command, 
mainly concerned with the non- negotiable need for the care of the 
individual. It can be considered an instrument that can support life 
in common, even to the point of communion, among people who 
currently encounter each other in the enormous variety of their 
diversity and often fail to recognize one another or even fall into 
hostility. Paul Ricoeur’s analysis can help to clarify this concept. It 
is not only a question of thinking about law as justice, even though 
this remains essential. Justice separates in order to resolve conten-
tion; that is, it decides by separating when it deals with what is, let 
us say, more specifically legal and relational.13 Hence, on the one 
hand, the act of giving judgment (which in the German Urteil em-
phasizes the notion of “parts” that are dealt out) is characterized by 
the judgment that separates the subjects in a dispute. On the other 
hand, however, if relationality is assumed as a hermeneutic key 
for law, it reintroduces and recalls in every relation the concrete 
person who is other. The term otherness is a necessary “part” of the 
very relation to which law gives life.14 Building relationships, then, 
13. Paul Ricoeur, The Just, trans. David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2000), 130.
14. The burning questions remain today for the philosophy of law. They have to accept 
the distinction between legality and justice, as pointed out by Bruno Romano in Due 
studi su forma e purezza del diritto (Turin: Giappichelli, 2008), 15 and 18–22. Here, 
“that self- questioning interested in the truth, understood . . . as the quality of relations 
among people” can be seen as the “measure to orientate the application of laws.” There 
is also a further dimension of the dialogue, in which each person can be observed to 
34C LAR ITAS | Journal of Dialogue & Culture | Vol. 3, No. 1 (March 2014) 
requires an “open” space, where the otherness in every legal relation 
can be experienced inasmuch as it is necessary to my being. At the 
same time, however, this is the “presence” of the other who looks 
to the law for protection, recognition, and inclusion into social 
life.
Here we have the legal dimension of “communion” as it is pos-
sible for the law. It is a paradigm that is not limited to the usual 
hereditary nature of jointly owned goods. Rather it is a commu-
nion that opens itself to the totality of the person following a new 
form of life in common as it is taking place within the histori-
cal process. Jürgen Habermas proposes a positive law capable of 
“linking solidarity with justice” in which “each person is respon-
sible for the other.”15 In this way, by providing norms for every 
kind of human life in common, law becomes something that can 
be questioned, since every norm also has someone to whom it is 
addressed: namely, the one who is other than me in a relationship, 
even though for Chiara, this person is also another me.16
“receive from the other the gift of the contents of his or her communication . . . living 
in common with the other in a third locus: the space for dialogue.”
15. Jürgen Habermas, Solidarietà tra estrane: Interventi su “Fatti e norme,” ed., L. Ceppa 
(Milan: Guerini e Associati, 1997), 11 and 96; and Jürgen Habermas, The Inclusion of 
the Other: Studies in Political Theory, eds., Ciaran Cronia and Pablo De Greift (Cam-
bridge: MIT Press, 1998), 10. Gurvitch also has a concept of social law as “the law of 
integration, of communion and collaboration.” It is, he explains, “a law of peace, of 
mutual help, of shared work” (Scerbo, Diritti sociali, 46). For further discussion, see 
also Rocio Caro Gándara and Antonio Márquez Prieto, “Il Diritto di Comunione di 
Georges Gurvitch e l’Economia di Comunione: Prime esplorazioni,” in Luigino Bruni 
and Luca Crivelli, Per una economia di comunione: Un approccio multidisciplinare (Rome: 
Città Nuova, 2004), 155–61; Vera Araújo, “Relazione sociale e fraternità: paradosso 
o modello sostenibile?” Nuova Umanità 6 (2005): 868–70. See also Giuseppe Capo-
grassi, Appunti, 414: “the law concerns the mutual help.”
16. This can be inferred, as a comment upon the golden rule, from the text “Una legge 
impressa in ogni cuore,” in Chiara Lubich, L’arte di amare (Rome: Città Nuova , 
2007), 60. For another perspective, Kelsen’s insights are significant. See “Staatsform 
Hence, we are dealing here with norm and life in dialogue with 
each other, proceeding from norms as static conditions to the dy-
namism of the relations they concern. It is true, at least in conti-
nental Europe and Latin America, that the legal relationship in 
itself is characterized to a great degree by abstraction. In such a 
world of norms, the concrete person with his or her vital needs 
does not exist; instead, there are abstract figures and typical roles, 
subjects to whom are ascribed rights and duties. And yet, in one 
of the last conversations with Norberto Bobbio, duty is defined as 
what the other has a right to expect from me,17 hence as our giving. 
It is an interpretative key that could redefine the reciprocity typical 
of the law, seeing it as a relational dimension between rights and 
duties. This recalls that the norm, in providing rules for our life in 
common, comes alive in the relations between subjects.
In a posthumously published comment, Piero Calamandrei 
says that “law and duty are always affirmed in reciprocal form”; law 
“cannot be affirmed in me without at the same time being affirmed 
in all of my fellows .  .  . it cannot be offended against by one of 
my fellows, without offending me.”18 Thus, as a result of the space 
for freedom and responsibility that the law leaves to each person, 
und Weltanschauung,” Die Wiener Rechtstheoretische Schule: Ausgewählte Schriften von 
Hans Kelsen, Adolf Julius Merkl und Alfred Verdross Vol. 2 (Vienna: Europa- Verlag, 
1968), 1923–42, in particular 1928, where the author, commenting upon the ideas 
of freedom and equality in comparison with the other, introduces the expression “das 
bist Du.”
17. Norberto Bobbio, and Maurizio Viroli, Dialogo intorno alla repubblica (Rome- 
Bari: Laterza, 2001), 45.
18. And again, in a passage from 1940, Calamandrei notes,“Each person knows that 
in the very moment he affirms his own right, he recognizes in that very same moment, 
on the basis of the same law, the right of his fellow and his own duty towards him.” 
Silvia Calamandrei, ed., Fede nel diritto (Rome- Bari: Laterza, 2008), 85 and 105. A 
contemporary view, while confirming this profoundly normative value, posits a vision 
of law as “essentially interpersonal relations and more precisely the relation among 
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life shaped by law offers the capacity to accept (as a pattern for a 
global response) the relational style that Chiara, amid the horrors 
of war, rediscovered as the possibility of mutual love. It is lived in 
the gift of self for “those who are nearby.” She experienced such a 
life from the very start, and it generated “a virtuous circle that re- 
established trust, renewed hope, rebuilt broken personal and civil 
bonds.”19 It is a giving that becomes a “strategy of attention” to the 
other person without qualification or preference, measured by the 
other’s needs. It operates on the basis that this person is my equal, 
apart from any role he or she may have. The other is not an object 
that I act upon, but a fully personal subject who coexists with me and 
for me. What Chiara offers as a prospect for a new humanism has 
all of humankind, indeed each human person, at its heart. And 
which human person is this? It is the other who is my brother or 
my sister.20
Rethinking Justice “Beyond” Conflict 
At this point, let us consider something else from Chiara’s thought 
that could perhaps give greater reality to the legal dimension of 
relational communion. Let us go back to the image that Chiara 
herself uses to speak of the other as understood from the stand-
point of someone who sees the other as a brother or sister. It is the 
image of an open door, and a door is not a door if you cannot “pass 
subjects recognized as equal.” Francesco D’Agostino, Diritto e giustizia: Per una intro-
duzione allo studio del diritto (Milan: San Paolo Edizioni , 2000), 10.
19. Chiara Lubich, “Vivere la speranza nella società globale del rischio,” Orvieto, Sep-
tember 7, 2003 (Message from Mollens, August 29, 2003).
20. See what Chiara herself said in New York at the United Nations, May 28, 1997, 
in a talk entitled “Verso l’unità delle nazioni e l’unità dei popoli” (Chiara Lubich, Una 
cultura nuova per una nuova società [Rome: Città Nuova, 2002], 42–50). For a simi-
lar conclusion when commenting upon the Economy of Communion, see Tommaso 
Sorgi, “La cultura del dare,” Nuova Umanità 80/81 (1992), particularly pages 87–91.
through it.” If that is the case, it becomes a wall, an obstacle block-
ing any entry.21 The deep relational meaning of such a perspective 
also applies to law.
How does this apply even in the face of the abyss of evil in 
humanity, the terrible wounds and many walls that people have 
thrown up through all of history? How does it apply to a human-
kind that seeks justice but lives in injustice? What about the recur-
ring image of law and justice as a “place where adversaries clash, 
a place of struggle, where dialogue is pushed aside” and divisions 
are radicalized?22 And yet, keeping such questions in mind, even 
in the face of the most dramatic conflict, Chiara outlines a model. 
It takes on a value that is, as it were, methodological and, acting 
as the “root” and “source” of further paradigms, allows a discovery 
and an exploration that leads to another image of justice, changed 
into that very place where divisions are recomposed.
Since the time of Ulpian (Dig. I, 1, 10), the principle suum 
cuique tribuere—“giving each their own”—has been familiar. But 
how can we understand what this basic tenet of justice, the tenet 
of giving, truly means for each person as a human being, seen in 
the light of the highest dignity of every individual? This principle 
is deeply rooted in Chiara’s thought and, as we have said, it turns 
into love for others to the point of becoming a culture of giving.23 
21. The powerful image here comes from an unpublished passage from 1949.
22. Luciano Eusebi, “Quale giustizia per una convivenza pacifica?” Dialoghi 2 (2002): 
57. The current complexity of the relationship between law and justice emerges like-
wise in Alain Supiot, Homo juridicus: Saggio sulla funzione antropologica del Diritto, 
trans., Ximena Rodríguez (Milan: Bruno Mondadori, 2006), 13–20. Despite neces-
sarily limiting ourselves to legal issues, a fundamental text for the ethics of “justice” is 
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, V.
23. Massimo Cacciari emphasizes the metanoia demanded by the gospel in “Il nomos 
dell’amore” (Massimo Cacciari, Ivano Dionigi, et al., La legge sovrana: Nomos basi-
leus [Milan: BUR, 2006], 79). This passage reflects Chiara’s words: “We felt that all 
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In a dimension at once theoretical and practical, Chiara explains 
giving as self- giving. It means making oneself a “gift” for the other. 
This produces a renewed reciprocity, and that reciprocity allows 
legal relationships to be lived out and so become a “space” where 
we listen to the other’s explanations, an “emptiness” that is love 
because it is able to welcome, com- prehend, fully take on board 
and take into ourselves the life of the other, and out of that mutual 
comprehension share problems and seek solutions.
It might be useful to use an analogy from research into repara-
tive justice, a perspective necessarily set in a relational context. 
It concerns a story about the artistry of a potter, and the potter’s 
relationship with emptiness in making a vase. This emptiness, 
we observe, in effect is what the potter encloses “in the creative 
act, where it is brought into relation with the fullness that exists 
in the things of the world.” That emptiness is not a “non- thing.” 
Heidegger emphasizes that it is not the clay, but the emptiness it 
contains that makes a vase, in “its essence as Thing,” something 
capable of holding a liquid. The emptiness thus becomes “neces-
sary, and not simply something that is not there.”24 In Chiara’s 
thought, emptiness is present as the “nothing of self ” that cannot 
be translated as “nothing at all” and that does not turn a person 
persons are created as a gift for the one next to them and the one next to them was 
created by God as a gift for every person,” which was the theme of her message to 
the participants at the International Congress, Relationships in Law: Is there a Place 
for Fraternity? (November 18–20, 2005), http://www.comunionediritto.org/en/eventi 
- testi/congresso- 2005/discorsi- 2005/26- messaggio- di- chiara- lubich.html.
24. Taoist thinking is parallel: “Clay is fashioned into vessels; but it is on their empty 
space, that their use depends. The door and windows are cut out to make a room; but 
it is on the empty space within, that its use depends. Thus what we gain is something, 
yet it is empty space that makes it useful” (Tao T’e Ching, 11). See also Marco Bou-
chard and Giovanni Mierolo, Offesa e riparazione: Per una nuova giustizia attraverso la 
mediazione (Milan: Bruno Mondadori, 2005), 96–9.
into “no one.” It allows and becomes the source for that space of 
acceptance and sharing possible insofar as it is the “locus” of being 
for the other.
Obviously there is an abyss between the model and the reality. 
And yet, precisely in that abyss, Chiara perceives the paradigm of 
gift. It can be seen in the making himself nothing of the One who, 
in his utter abandonment on the cross, made his own, with and 
for each human being, the most unfathomable “emptiness” and, as 
he cried out his forsakenness, filled it with his presence, and hence 
with his love. Chiara opens up the way to knock down the walls of 
separation between equals as well as between those who are differ-
ent, the walls of division wherever they may be.
Chiara’s thought becomes a discourse on justice. Nowadays, 
despite the rich and extensive literature on the subject of jus-
tice, contemporary discourse tends to focus on the innumerable 
and horrific injustices “beyond” any theory. In Chiara’s thought 
and life, however, injustice takes on the particular meaning of a 
“wound” in human relations, a social dimension that calls out to 
the humanity of each person. In seeking an answer to that “forsak-
enness” of Jesus, which makes God at once victim and condemned, 
it is confirmed that in themselves norms are insufficient and in 
themselves do not grant justice. This is given voice in that “cry,” as 
Chiara wrote in 1944, where “in that place justice is dead,”25 and 
the dramas of history confirm that the law can bring about the 
death of the innocent. Gustav Radbruch has posed the question 
of the degree of intolerability of “unjust” (Unerträglichkeitsformel) 
law, and so emphasizes that the purpose of law, including positive 
25. Christmas letter to Pierita Folgheraiter, in Chiara Lubich, Early Letters: At the 
Origins of a New Spirituality (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 2012), 31.
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law, should be to serve justice.26 More recently, in his latest work 
Federico Stella, a penologist, begins his analysis by examining the 
infinite injustices generated by the idea of “throw- away lives.” He 
affirms, “However rare it may be, all the same, none of us can be 
exempt from taking the step of love and thus of justice”; and he 
looks to the “first step,” which is recognition of the other.27
It is thus possible to understand how at the heart of every in-
justice there is a choice, violent or not, to “exclude otherness.”28 
That giving, indicated as the criterion of justice that considers the 
other, in Chiara has the value of love that becomes giving and 
self- giving, in principle to everyone. As such it provides content 
to justice itself, in such a way that justice, often excluded from the 
variables falling within the purview of the law, returns as a quality 
of its relational basis. Law and justice are then brought back to 
their common root where justice, “the guardian of relationships,” 
26. This is what Radbruch says in “Gesetzliches Unrecht und übergesetzliches Recht” 
(1946), and in his Rechtsphilosophie: Vierte Auflage, ed., Erik Wolf (Stuttgart: K. F. 
Koehler, 1950), 347–57, in particular, 353. See likewise Giuliano Vassalli, Formula 
di Radbruch e diritto penale: Note sulla punizione dei “delitti di Stato” nella Germania 
postnazista e nella Germania postcomunista (Milan: Giuffrè, 2001), 4–10 and 279–90. 
Kelsen takes a different view of all discourse on justice when considering compliance 
with prescriptions of normative order, in his Das Problem der Gerechtigkeit (Vienna: 
F. Deuticke, 1960).
27. Federico Stella, La giustizia e le ingiustizie (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2006), 176–83 
and 202–5. See likewise Carlo Maria Martini and Gustavo Zagrebelsky, La domanda 
di giustizia (Turin: Einaudi, 2003), 3–43, as well as Paul Ricoeur, Amore e giustizia, 
ed., Ilario Bertoletti (Brescia: Morcelliana, 2003), 23–45 and Bertoletti, Postfazione, 
53–9 (Original title: Liebe und Gerechtigkeit and Amour et Justice [Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 1990]). For a recent perspective commenting on the “new” exclusions, see 
Maria Zanichelli, Persone prima che disabili: Una riflessione sull’ handicap tra giustizia 
ed etica (Brescia: Queriniana Edizioni, 2012), 25–35 where he considers the latest 
reflection upon the theory of John Rawls, especially his fundamental A Theory of Justice 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971).
28. See Romano, Due studi, 18.
goes beyond mere legal practice to become solidarity and the ca-
pacity to identify with every situation of discomfort and pain. It 
has a universal value because it is the possibility offered to all of re-
building a logic of infinite free- gift in relations, almost as if it were 
guarding, to use Arendt’s words again, “the capacity to enter into 
relationship with the others and above all to put oneself in the oth-
er’s place.”29 From that abyss, where total injustice is shared with 
humanity, is born a renewed solidarity with people. For Chiara it 
is the “way” of “taking the other into oneself ” in a new relational 
bond beyond every kind of forsakenness. No one is excluded from 
its embrace and the category of “foreign” collapses into “brother” 
and “sister,” people with whom the human family is to be built.
In an interview (2007) Maria Voce has said: “Everything that 
can be thought of as ‘evil’ in legal relations cannot have a destruc-
tive effect if there is someone who decides to let it be cancelled in 
their own person, out of love, that is, doing so as a free gift, with-
out asking for compensation, reacting in a constructive manner.” 
The ability to restore the destruction wrought in persons and in re-
lationships thus means to recover the relational ability at the heart 
of every form of common life. It is a matter of working together, 
within the fabric of society, to regenerate the primary source of the 
law itself, in its relational essence. We can even say that, beyond 
any coercive intervention, the law becomes a positive instrument. 
It is not just a “key” to reestablishing our relationships within our 
29. Papa, Nati per incominciare, 10. See, likewise, the introduction of Luca Alici, in his 
Il diritto di punire: Testi di Paul Ricoeur (Brescia: Morcelliana, 2012), 11–28. This is 
also present in the sphere of the penal system, where, according to several authors, the 
kind of justice sought is reinterpreted as an attempt to “reconstruct an intersubjective 
relationship that has been damaged or broken,” as Francesco Viola and Giuseppe Zac-
caria put it in their Le ragioni del diritto (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2003), 67.
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common life, supporting and healing social interactions when they 
break down. It is, additionally and above all, an effective instru-
ment for the avoidance of conflict.
At this point in the legal- penal debate, theories and funda-
mental issues regarding justice need to be taken into account. This 
means looking at the contents of penal sanctions and seeking to 
discern their basis. While retribution offers a way of measuring 
sanctions in response to violations of the law, reparation, as a “new 
way” for justice, could be society’s response to a person’s human-
ity, a method of rescuing the other as well as establishing a rela-
tionship with the other. Nowadays, from the most recent analyses 
of justice that seek alternative forms of conflict resolution (ADR, 
Diversion and Mediation) to Restorative Justice, the search is for 
solutions characterized by a “reparative approach,” which inter-
prets illicit acts as offenses against the person and sees them within 
a relational context. As far back as the 1980s, Howard Zehr and 
Mark S. Umbreit sought a response to conflict based on reparatory 
logic.30 It was also the method that the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission used in its attempt to heal South Africa after the 
30. “Forgiveness sets aside; the gift of reparation brings back together and connects,” 
according to Bouchard and Mierolo, Offesa e riparazione, 67; see likewise Paul Ricoeur 
on “restorative and reconstructive justice” in Il diritto di punire, ed., Luca Alici, 85–94. 
Among the many studies that examine the topic from an Anglo- Saxon perspective, 
see Mark S. Umbreit, The Handbook of Victim Offender Mediation (San Francisco: 
Jossey- Bass, 2001), in particular xxv- xxxix.; for an overview, see John Harding, “Rec-
onciling mediation with criminal justice” and Burt Galaway, “Prospects,” in eds., Mar-
tin Wright and Burt Galaway , Mediation and Criminal Justice: Victims, Offenders and 
Community (London: Sage, 1989), 27–42 and 270–75. The topic, which is now also 
widely discussed in Italy, has been recently considered by Federico Reggio, Giustizia 
dialogica: Luci e ombre della restorative justice (Milan: Franco Angeli, 2010), which also 
includes a full Italian biography.
crimes committed under apartheid.31 This seems to outline a privi-
leged space for dialogue and reciprocity, understood in the con-
text of a new assumption of responsibility, even though prepared 
instruments for reconciliation may not in themselves bring about 
genuine reconciliation if openness to the otherness of the other is 
not taken as its necessary measure.
In the relational field, what source can then be drawn upon by 
restorative justice, if it is not a matter of paying a price but of filling 
a void and restoring a lost identity? Let us try to reread reparation 
from the standpoint where Chiara grounds us, that is, the place 
of that “forsakenness” that brings about God’s encounter with the 
very humanity of human beings. Here reparation becomes the pos-
sibility, offered to each person’s responsibility, of rising from any 
abyss. This happens as the gift of a relationship of love that can 
bring about renewal that heals wounds and reintegrates persons 
and groups in society. Paolo Borsellino, a magistrate killed by the 
mafia, said of himself: “I didn’t like Palermo, and for that I have 
learned to love it. Because true love is a matter of loving what we 
don’t like in order to change it.”32
31. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission was set up in 1995 with the Promotion 
of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34. For a general description and history see 
Anna Maria Gentili and Andrea Lollini, “L’esperienza delle commissioni per la verità 
e la riconciliazione: Il caso sudafricano in una prospettiva giuridico- politica,” in, eds., 
Giulio Illuminati, et. al, Crimini internazionali tra diritto e giustizia: Dai Tribunali 
Internazionali alle Commissioni Verità e Riconciliazione (Turin: Giappichelli, 2000), 
163–209. A similar approach was taken in the painful situation in Peru. See Gabriella 
Citroni, L’orrore rivelato: L’esperienza della Commissione della verità e riconciliazione in 
Perù: 1980–2000 (Milan: Giuffrè, 2004), in particular 119–30.
32. This statement is found at the top of the website Paolo Borsellino e l’agenda rossa, 
http://www.19luglio1992.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=16
76:paolo- borsellino- e- lagenda- rossa&catid=17:libri&Itemid=29.
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To conclude, let me cite Chiara’s unpublished message in 
Rome to the 2005 International Congress for Practitioners and 
Scholars of Law: 
I would like to see this regulative function [of law] animated 
by the new commandment of mutual love, so it can lead 
to the full realization of persons and of the relationships to 
which . . . persons give life. In this way, in its specifically 
normative function, as also in the daily practice of all the re-
lations entailed by legal life . . . you will be able to contribute 
to making humankind become a family. 
It may seem like a dream, but in reality it is a new understanding 
from which law is also reinterpreted. Law is no longer considered 
an instrument for maintaining boundaries, excluding some and 
including others, but as a bridge. This may preserve an objective 
distance, but only in order to make it practicable, possible to over-
come otherwise insuperable voids.
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